

FINAL DRAFT

28 JAN 1963

BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS

1. By early 1959, after three years of operation, first as a special project, HTAUTOMAT, and later as the Photographic Intelligence Center, an office under the DD/I, it was becoming obvious to senior officials of the Agency, the intelligence community, and the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, that both the methods and scale of operations of PIC were already inadequate and were to become increasingly more so during the ensuing years.

2. A substantial percentage of each input from the collection systems of that day was being backlogged and time coupled with limited resources permitted only a "skimming" of the materials. Still in the planning stage, were advanced systems, the increased takes from which could only result in an inundation of the activity unless forward planning was undertaken and proceeded apace.


3. At this point in time, Mr. Bissell, then the CIA officer responsible for collection programs, arranged with Mr. Amory, DDI, and Mr. Lundahl to have the ITEK Corporation of Boston, Mass., carry out a study of Center operations with a view toward proposing an optimum system for full exploitation of present and projected data. The results of the study, which were presented to General Cabell, Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Bissell, Amory, White, Lundahl, and the President's Scientific Advisory Committee in October 1959, called for a national exploitation Center with a vastly expanded personnel base (over PI's alone), an integrated exploitation system, and a new building to house this facility.

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4. Many of the recommendations contained in this independent report confirmed and expanded upon the projections and views of the senior personnel of PIC, which was operating informally on a joint basis at that time with personnel from the Army and Navy as well as CIA. The projected input figures being furnished by the collectors, the experience of our own personnel in processing large volumes of photography, and the recommendations of ITEK as to the necessity for a greatly expanded and more sophisticated exploitation activity led the Center to redouble its efforts in the area of forward planning.

5. The first step was to enlist help in the area of analysis and systems design for the eventual automation of as many aspects of the activity as possible. Coupled with this was the need for planning the layout and housing of the activity in new and more acceptable quarters since it was apparent to all concerned that the Steuart Building contained neither sufficient space

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nor an environment even approaching that necessary for the full exploitation of higher resolution photography. The Center which had already been obtaining planning advice for the several specialist areas of PIC from such firms as Eastman Kodak, ITEK, and Houston-Fearless contracted with the A&E firm of [redacted] in June 1960, to provide the aforementioned STAT services, plus others, and the first concrete steps toward the necessary relocation of the activity were undertaken.

6. During this same period, late 1959 through early 1960, discussions were being held with Office of Logistics and GSA personnel in an effort to locate suitable space. A wide variety of plans were considered, including: building an annex to the new CIA Headquarters Building, constructing new quarters in [redacted] renovating a then empty laundry, and finally, acquisition of Building 213. Realizing the impracticalities of getting Congress to appropriate more funds for an annex to Langley and appreciating the size of the activity which would eventually have to be provided for, and since the Government already owned Building 213, it became apparent that this facility was the most logical choice, and negotiations were commenced to acquire it. The Center in collaboration with [redacted] continued through 1960 and the bulk of 1961 with the analysis, concepts planning, and design of the systems and layout of the anticipated National Center. The Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities, issued in December 1960, reaffirmed the need for a single photographic center of common concern and vindicated the planning efforts being carried forward.

7. In January 1961, the die was cast when the President and the National Security Council approved NSCID #8, charging the Director of Central Intelligence with providing a national photographic interpretation center of common concern. The budget and personnel estimates prepared by the Center in June 1961, requested the necessary and realizable increases required to fulfill the CIA commitment. Specifically, a T/O of [redacted] was requested for Fiscal Year 1962 and an augmentation of up to [redacted] for Fiscal Year 1963. While the inputs being received and planned for at that time actually called for a greater strength than requested, the practical impossibility of recruiting and, indeed, housing anymore personnel played a major role in arriving at the totals requested. These budget estimates were approved by the DDI and the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. By spring of 1961, the future of the west end of the Navy Yard and specifically Building 213 had been determined by Congress, the Navy, GSA, and for its part, CIA. As systems design and layout plans were developed within the Center and discussed with the Office of Logistics, it was realized that the eventual space required for long term expansion and the peculiar environmental and security requirements necessary for the housing of the

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National Center dictated the need for NPIC to have essentially sole use of the facility. The earlier personnel estimates of the eventual need for over [] personnel, approximately [] PI's plus support personnel, were holding up in light of the systems planning and input figures being furnished the Center by the collectors and the additional experience the Center was gaining in exploiting the incoming materials. Further, the increasing sophistication of planned inputs reiterated the fact that environmental conditions must be specifically tailored to the activity and be of the highest order, in many instances approaching if not duplicating the so-called "white gloves" laboratory. Vibration, dust, humidity and temperature controls, special electrical lighting and air handling systems, to say nothing of stringent security requirements, all had to be provided if the building was to represent a flexible, well-balanced, long-term investment. To have planned for and requested anything less would have been to deny the facts available to the responsible personnel in the Agency.

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9. The Center's plans for the occupation of the entire building [minus USGS space in the 6th floor] and the required security and environmental concepts were approved by the DDI and the DDS in the spring of 1961.

10. The decision having been made to renovate all of Building 213 for NPIC, except for USGS space, an A&E contract was let by GSA with [] in June 1961, with an estimated construction completion date of August 1963. The selection of this firm was an obvious choice in that through their prior work over the 1960-1961 period they had gained an intimate knowledge of the Center's operations and its peculiar facility requirements. Shortly thereafter, following a briefing by NPIC, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee urged the President to request the utmost speed and effort in the completion of Building 213 for NPIC use. Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, addressed a letter to the Agency on 11 October 1961, expressing the President's wishes, and the entire planning and construction cycle was telescoped from a planned 26 month period to 18 months. Had the design layout and detailed planning efforts put forth by NPIC and [] not taken place over the preceding months, it would have been all but impossible to furnish the necessary drawings and specifications to a contractor in order to complete the building in the time allowed by the President and the Director of Central Intelligence.

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11. As final schematics and layouts were developed by [] they were brought to the Center for approval and eventually to Mr. Amory, the then DDI. The demolition and construction phases of the building are discussed later in this paper.

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12. The personnel requirements of the Center which were initially projected and discussed early in 1959, remain to this day valid estimates, at least so far as NPIC is concerned. Subsequent requests for authorization of a personnel strength of [] persons in Fiscal Year 1963 and [] persons by 1964 were forwarded by NPIC and approved by the DDI and the Director of Central Intelligence. These requirements coupled with the military input of [] PI's by 1964, plus a small number of military support personnel, plus an Army departmental activity of approximately [] persons, total approximately [] people, the planning figure which has been consistently used.

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13. The ratio of usable square footage to personnel in Building 213 is, of course, much higher than that encountered in the CIA Headquarters Building, or any normal office building for that matter. The nature of the operation, requiring such large areas for photographic processing and development, mixing of chemicals, housing of computers, accommodating mensuration equipment, providing experimental laboratory space, furnishing adequate drafting, illustration and layout areas, and providing for the vast film holdings and map files, plus having to furnish the personnel working in these areas with some minimum normal office space in which to handle their administrative and normal paper work, invalidates any concept of square foot per person ratios normally assigned in regular Federal office buildings. The percentage of true office space in this building is negligible, amounting to only 21 percent of the total. The costliness of readying these many specially designed areas as opposed to normal costs incurred in building a typical office building is necessarily sizeable but inherent in the nature of the operation. This very fact mitigated against locating the Center in any building which did not offer at least a minimum expansion capability of five years and, likewise, made impractical the construction of the building in segments or parts. To have done the latter would only have increased the eventual costs to be incurred and presented the operation with a continuing chain of interruptions with the resultant adverse effect on its production capability. In the case of some major items such as air handling, electrical systems, etc., such a course of construction would have been virtually impossible.

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

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When Col. White was outlining the problem - to prepare a case history report on Bldg. 213 - he said the following questions were asked by General Carter:

a. Why do we have a building that is only one-half occupied?

b. Who made the personnel estimate?

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c. Why was the entire building modified?

d. The original construction estimate was why the
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e. What controls were exercised?

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